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NOTES AND COMMENT
While these latter cases present situations where income from a
trust can be validly retained by the trustee for long periods of time,
the general statutory prohibitions against accumulations remain in
full vigor. The policy behind the statutes must always be considered.
Whether an annuity be specified or the amount be discretionary, the
trustee will be prohibited from tying up income either by way of capi-
talization or by the creation of reserve funds. The fact that the ac-
cumulations arise incident to the administration of the trust and are
in no way connected with the main purpose of the trust will not save
them from the stigma of illegality. The language of the statute is
broad and will be broadly construed by the courts to give full effect
to the statutory policy.
GEORGE F. MASON, JR.
NEw YORK CvL PRACTICE ACT; SEccroN 235, 1946 VERsION
-DoEs IT ENLARGE CouRT's JURISDICTION?
The concept of jurisdiction is an inherent part of the judicial
process. One view that might be taken of jurisdiction as existent in
American jurisprudence is that it is a limitation upon the power of
the court, imposed by the individual. As the residuary of all power,
he guaranteed to himself reasonable notice of complaint and oppor-
tunity to defend, and required that the summoning judicial tribunal
should have authoritative power over the person of a defendant, or
over the property or res toward which the litigation is directed. Such
guarantee is perpetuated by the due process requirement in the Fed-
eral Constitution.'
Justice Holmes, speaking in McDonald v. Mabee,2 notes that
the "foundation of jurisdiction is physical power." 3 Violent body
arrest, however, is rarely resorted to today for the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. It is sufficient for
the acquisition of jurisdiction that the defendant is within the physi-
cal borders of the state when served.
But there is a more refined power that exists in a political sov-
ereignty over its citizens, residents and domiciliaries. It is a power
that survives a temporary inability to reduce a defendant to bodily
custody. It is a power in the state, and a duty in the person, ex-
plicable and justifiable in view of the privileges afforded the person
by virtue of his status in the state. Upon satisfactory notice of suit,
U. S. Co sT. Amwms. V, XIV.
2 243 U. S. 90, 61 L. ed. 608 (1917).
3 Id. at 91.
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though he be without the physical borders of the state, this duty takes
the form of amenability to the process of the state. Concededly this
power and corresponding duty is limited, by analysis of its basis, to
residents of the state. No degree of notice or opportunity to defend
will warrant assuming personal jurisdiction over non-residents. 4 The
fundamental power is lacking.
Rhetorically, it might be asked whether it is not enigmatic that
the protecting state subjects its own residents to greater suscepti-
bility to suit than non-residents. The answer lies in a consideration
of the purpose of the judiciary. The sound administration of justice
i's held to be one of the very pillars of successful government. Ex-
penses are incurred and time and effort are consumed in establishing,
maintaining and improving adequate court systems. It is imperative
that courts be readily accessible for the speedy litigation of claims,
settlement of disputes, and remedy of wrongs. Defense of an action
is not necessarily onerous or penal. It is merely compliance with an
obligation that flows from a right which is jealously guarded. Any
system of jurisprudence having its roots in the common law affords
a party who believes himself aggrieved, opportunity to seek, without
restraint, judicial determination of his cause, and one who preserves
such right to himself, by his own laws, cannot validly object to its
exercise by another. Furthermore, it is the prerogative of those af-
fected to utilize their voting power to abrogate this obligation by
legislative enactment. Another alternative is afforded to voting and
non-voting residents alike by the American conception of allegiance;
that affiliation with the state, be it citizenship, domicile or residence,
is subject to the continued will of the individual and may at any time
be renounced.
Heretofore, a prospective plaintiff being within the defendant's
"home" state, often found that the would-be defendant had removed
himself from the state to avoid litigation. This is all too prevalent
in this country of numerous sovereign states and modern modes of
transportation. Ordinarily this flight is an absolute bar to obtaining
personal jurisdiction, and in the instances when in ren jurisdiction
will suffice, there are temporal and monetary considerations which
are, if not prohibitive, at least burdensome. It might not be too sub-
jective to venture the opinion that such conduct and obstacles were
not anticipated by the founders of our judicial system, nor would
they condone such interstate hide and seek as an exercise of sound
justice.
Toward this end of sound justice and to meet present conditions
with modem laws, New York State recently revised its laws dealing
with the acquisition of jurisdiction by service of summons by publi-
cation 5 and personal service without the state. 6
4 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565 (1877).
5 N. Y. CIv. PRAc. Act §§ 232, 232(a), 232(b).
6 N. Y. Civ. PRmc. Acr §§ 233, 234, 235.
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Most notable among the changes is the present Section 235 of
the Civil Practice Act which reads as follows:
Where the defendant is a resident of the state and the complaint demands
judgment for a sum of money only, and in any case specified in section two
hundred thirty-two of this act, the summons may be served without an order,
upon a defendant without the state in the same manner as if such service were
made within the state, except that a copy of the verified complaint must be
annexed to and served with the summons, and that such service must be made
by a person or officer authorized under section two hundred thirty-three of this
act to make service without the state in lieu of publication. Proof of service
without the state without an order shall be filed within sixty days after such
service. Service without the state without an order is complete ten days after
proof thereof is filed.7
It can be seen that the section makes a distinction, in part, be-
tween residents and non-residents; distinguishes causes of action;
refers to causes of action set forth in another section of the Civil
Practice Act; 8 and gives the mechanics of its operation. Nothing
is expressly stated as to what type of jurisdiction is procured by a
plaintiff who follows its mandate. Is it in personam? In rem?
Quasi in rem? Is the type of jurisdiction different when the defen-
dant is a resident than when he is a non-resident? Does it depend
on the cause of action? Is it determined by a combination of both
the type of defendant and the cause of action? In brief, our inquiry
is the extent and nature of the jurisdiction acquired under this section
of the Act.
It is apparent that Section 235 may be used to effect service of
summons in four general classes of cases:
1. Actions for a sum of money only where the defendant is a
resident of the state.
2. Matrimonial actions.9
7 N. Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT § 235.
8 N. Y. Crv. PRAc. ACT § 232. In what actions order for service of sum-
mons by publication may be made. An order directing the service of a sum-
mons upon a defendant by publication, may be made upon the application of
the plaintiff, as specified in sections tvo hundred thirty two-a and two hundred
thirty two-b of the act, in any of the following actions:
1. Where the complaint demands judgment annulling a marriage, or for a
divorce or a separation.
2. Where the complaint demands judgment that the defendant be excluded
from a vested or contingent interest in or lien upon specific real or per-
sonal property within the state; or that such an interest or lien in favor
of either party be enforced, regulated, defined or limited; or otherwise
affecting the title to such property.
3. Where a levy upon property of the defendant within the state has been
made under a warrant of attachment granted in an action to recover a
sum of money only.
9N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AT § 232(1).
1947]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
3. Actions affecting specific property.10
4. Actions where a warrant of attachment has been ordered and
levy has been made."
It is well to note that the reason given by the draftsmen of the
statute, for the general provision in Section 235 incorporating Sec-
tion 232 was to attain simplicity and conciseness, rather than a long
enumeration repetitious of that which is contained in Section 232.12
In both former Section 232 and former Section 235 substantially
identical provisions were to be found governing the matrimonial,
specific property and attachment actions to which both the sections
were applicable. "Though the application of Section 235 (prior to
the 1946 amendment)' is seemingly limited to cases involving
1. exclusion from- specific property within the state, 2. matrimonial
actions, and 3. actions in which attachment has been levied, the sec-
tion in fact comprehends all of the eight cases now specified in Sec-
tion 232 (prior to 1946 amendment).14 Such variation in specifica-
tion leads to confusion."' 1 Thus both of the old sections were
mutually applicable to the same causes of action with the distinction
lying in the manner of the service of the summons. The jurisdic-
tion, acquired under both of the old sections (232, 235) had the same
effect, whether the service was by publication or personally without
the state. Both were considered to be constructive service. Either
procedure entitled a plaintiff to the same type of jurisdiction over his
adversary.'8 The interrelation still exists under the amended sec-
tions. "Implicit in the implementation of Section 235 is compliance
with Section 232-a (persons against whom an order for service by
publication may be made) and 232-b (use of due diligence, if required
by the publication statute, to make personal service within the state).
These limitations arise from the fact that Section 232 by its terms
must be read with Sections 232-a and 232-b." 17 The new sections
are complementary and must be read together.
To summarize, the application of old Section 235 was concurrent
with old Section 232. The revised Section 232 has made no change
in substance. This section has been expressly incorporated in Section
235. An examination of Section 232 and the related cases thereunder
should define the application and limitations of one phase of Section
235. Actions for a sum of money only will be considered separately
infra.
2oN. Y. Civ. Prec. Acr §232(2).
1N. Y. Civ. PrAc. Acr § 232(3).
12 11 REP. JUDICIAL COUNCIL 215 (1945).
13 Bracketed material added.
26 Bracketed material added.
25 11 REP. JUDIcIAL COUNCI. 215, 216 (1945).
162 CARmODY, PLEADING AND PRACrIcE 1293 (1930).
17 PRAsnxm, NEw YoRx PRACTICE 115 (1947).
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Section 232-1 18 which authorizes service of summons by pub-
lication in marital actions was formerly Zontained in Section 232-5.'0
Form was changed in the 1946 amendment but not substance.20
Nowhere in the revised sections which replaced the former Section
232, nor in the report of the Judicial Council which drafted and pro-
posed the new law, is there any suggestion that the type of juris-
diction formerly acquired, was to be changed. 21
Jurisdiction acquired by a court in matrimonial actions has a
dual aspect; that jurisdiction which is necessary for the court to alter
the marital status between the parties (annulment, divorce, and sep-
aration) and that which is necessary to grant incidental relief along
with the altering of the status (alimony, counsel fees, custody of
children, etc.). The jurisdiction to alter the status is in rem and is
based on domicile of one of the parties.22 On the other hand alimony
and counsel fees are essentially in personam and based upon the ac-
quisition of personal jurisdiction. Service of the summons by publi-
cation is sufficient notice to an absent defendant to effect a change in
the marital status.23 Such is the case whether the absent defendant
be a resident of New York or not. Due process is satisfied by the
combination of the marital status within the state and the notice by
publication.2 4  When available, service by publication is permitted
irrespective of the defendant's residence or non-residence. 2 As
against a non-resident defendant, alimony or counsel fees may not be
awarded where jurisdiction is based on service by publication. Such
service is insufficient for the granting of an in personam judgment.28
Personal jurisdiction of 'the defendant has always been required for
the granting of alimony, except in the case of sequestration pro-
ceedings.27 Sequestration is similar in many respects, to attachment,
which is not permitted in matrimonial actions.28 The court may
order sequestration of property of the defendant located within the
state any time prior to judgment. If the defendant is given sufficient
notice and adequate opportunity to defend, alimony may be awarded
from the proceeds. Where there has been such sequestration, the
court acquires, its jurisdiction for such award from seizure of the
18 See note 8 supra.
29 N. Y. Laws 1921, c. 199, as amended by N. Y. Laws 1929, c. 644.20 Prashker, New York's Statutes Governing Service of Summons by Pub-
lication: The Revision of 1946, 21 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 18 (1946).
2 11 REP. JlroicAL CouNIcm 193-220 (1945).22 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, 89 L. ed. 1577 (1945).
23 Rosenblum v. Rosenblum, 181 Misc. 78, 42 N. Y. S. 2d 626 (Sup. Ct.
1943).24 Rigney v. Rigney, 127 N. Y. 408, 28 N. E. 405 (1891).2 5 Becker v. Becker, 58 App. Div. 374, 69 N. Y. Su p. 75 (Ist Dep't 1901).28 Baylies v. Baylies, 196 App. Div. 677, 188 N. Y. Supp. 147 (2d Dep't
1921).27 N. Y. Cwv. PRc. AcT §§ 1171-1173; Burch v. Busch, 116 App. Div. 865,
102 N. Y. Supp. 305 (2d Dep't 1907).
28N. Y. Crv. Pa. c. Acs § 902.
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property prior to adjudication.29 The law presumes that property
is always in the possession of its owner. The seizure of the prop-
erty by the court is deemed to have a notice giving effect. This notice
is augmented by further notice served by publication. The combined
effect is sufficient to satisfy due process of law.80
As was stated, thc granting of alimony against a non-resident
defendant where service of the summons is by publication is im-
proper."' A nice question arises as to whether or not the same rule
is applicable to a resident defendant. An exhaustive search of the
records of New York yields no case in which such a decree or judg-
ment was either granted or denied. A leading authority on New
York Practice indicates that by such service in personam jurisdiction
is acquired over a resident. The reasoning is that a resident of the
state owes allegiance to the state and has the duty of submitting to
its process whatever the form may be. It is only necessary that rea-
sonable notice and opportunity to defend be given to satisfy due
process.32 As authority for the foregoing, the author cites Hunt v.
Hunt 3 3 where the court said,34 "It is a part of the law of the State,
of which the defendant is a subject and a citizen. That law binding
upon him is an assent given by him, that there may and will be ac-
quired jurisdiction over him to hear a case and render judgment;
affecting to an extent 35 his personal rights. As a denizen and a
citizen of the State, he owes it allegiance, and is under the force and
authority of its laws; and so long as he remains in that relation, he
cannot throw off his subjection by the act of temporary or prolonged
absence from the State. He is still amenable to those laws, and bound
by their. provisions as to substituted (constructive) service of
process."
It is to -be noted that in the Hunt case there was no issue of ali-
mony involved. In personam jurisdiction of the defendant was
deemed necessary for the granting of the divorce itself. Such state-
ments in Hunt v. Hunt have been used by later cases, but the rule
has not been followed in any case to the extent of holding in personam
jurisdiction is acquired over a resident served by publication. In an
action on a foreign judgment which was procured in Wisconsin
against a resident of that state by constructive service, the New York
court held it to be a valid in personam judgment entitled to full faith
and credit.3 6 Substituted service (service other than personally with-
in the state) over residents was held to give valid in personam juris-
diction and when in accordance with the state law, not violative of
29 Geary v. Geary, 272 N. Y. 390, 6 N. E. 2d 67 (1936).30 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565 (1877).
31 See note 26 supra.
322 CARMODY, PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 729 (1930).
3 3 Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N. Y. 217 (1878).
34 Id. at 239.
35 Italics added.
sB Huntley v. Baker, 33 Hun 578 (N. Y. 1884).
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due process.3 7 Strict substituted service was held sufficient for the
acquisition of personal jurisdiction of a resident.38 A divorce decree
of a Vermont court where the defendant was served by publication
was held to give valid in personam jurisdiction, no alimony being in-
volved.39 The latest holding on the basis of the Hunt case was an
action in New York on a judgment obtained in England against a
resident thereof. The court held, citing also Huntley v. Baker,40 that
valid in personam jurisdiction was acquired by service of the process
of the English court personally within New York and that the judg-
ment was conclusive. 41
It is doubtful whether the preceding authorities would be suffi-
cient to sustain an alimony judgment against an absent resident where
service is made by publication.
As heretofore noted, there is no square holding in New York
on the point; however there are other cases which indicate the oppo-
site view; that even as against a resident constructive service alone
is insufficient for rendering an in personam judgment. In an action
for separation, custody of the child and injunction of divorce proceed-
ings instituted in Nevada by the defendant, the court held that the
in personam relief asked could not be granted for lack of jurisdiction
of the person of the defendant. "Even in the case of a resident of
this State leaving the jurisdiction to evade its process, the court in
such an action founded upon constructive service may go no further
than to adjudicate with respect to the marital status and notwith-
standing the provisions of the Civil Practice Act, may not award
alimony or costs so as to charge such absent resident personally
therewith." 42 Constructive service was made twenty-one days after
the defendant left her New York residence. 43 As authority for this
rule, the court cited two other New York cases.4 4  In these cases
service by publication was held insufficient to support an alimony
judgment. 45 It seems doubtful that service by publication will sup-
port an alimony judgment even as against a resident.
8 Ibid.
38 Continental National Bank v. Thurber, 74 Hun 632, 26 N. Y. Supp. 956
(N. Y. 1893), aff'd, 143 N. Y. 648.39 Hammond v. Hammond, 103 App. Div. 437, 93 N. Y. Supp. 1 (1st Dep't
1905).
40 See note 36 supra.
41 Rhodesian Gen. Finance, etc., Trust v. MacQuisten, 170 Misc. 996, 11
N. Y. S. 2d 476 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
42 May v. May, 233 App. Div. 519, 520, 253 N. Y. Supp. 606, 607 (1st
Dep't 1931).
43 May v.-May, 233 App. Div. 519, 253 N. Y. Supp. 606 (1st Dep't 1931).44 Edwards v. Edson, 119 App. Div. 684, 104 N. Y. Supp. 292 (3d Dep't
1907); Baylies v. Baylies, 196 App. Div. 677, 188 N. Y. Supp. 147 (2d Dep't
1921).
45 Accord, Robinson v. Robinson, 123 Misc. 80, 204 N. Y. Supp. 245 (Sup.
Ct. 1924).
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Section 232-2 46 which authorizes service of the summons by
publication in actions affecting specific property within the state was
formerly contained in subdivision 6 of the old section.47 As the text
of the new section is identical to the old, it would seem that no change
was intended by the draftsmen of the statute as to what type of jur-
isdiction and the actions thereunder that would come within its pur-
view.48  Common examples of actions within this section are fore-
closure of a mortgage,49 partition,5 ° and specific performance of a
contract.51 Application has also been made of the section as applied
to specific personal property within the state as foreclosure of an
attorney's lien against a fund,5 2 -an action concerning a bank deposit
to the credit of partner sued for an accounting, 53 and an action to
impress a trust on funds held by a bank.54  Jurisdiction is acquired
in these cases by publication coupled with the presence within the
state of the specific property which is the subject matter of the action.
It is in rent jurisdiction and cannot be made the basis of an in
personam judgment. A deficiency judgment cannot be given in a
foreclosure of a real property mortgage against a non-resident. 55 Nor
can a deficiency judgment be granted against a resident defendant.
The limitation on the granting of a deficiency judgment is that the
defendant be personally served.56 This is a statutory limitation which
does not afford the alternatives of service by publication or personal
service without the state.57 In an action to foreclose a lien or mort-
gage on personal property an in personam judgment may be rendered
only where the defendant has been personally served.58 A court in
an equity action cannot give money damages in lieu of specific per-
formance against a non-resident but the fact that the complaint asks
for damages in lieu of specific performance will not be grounds for
a denial of an order for service by publication.5" Where the subject
matter of the action is specific property within the state and the de-
fendant is a New York resident, no authority could be found as to
46 See note 8 supra.
47 N. Y. Laws 1921, c. 199, as amended by N. Y. Laws 1929, c. 644.
48 11 REP. JUDICl. COucicL 195, 196 (1945) ; Prashker, New York's Stat-
utes Governing Service of Sumnwns by Publication: The Revision of 1946,
21 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 18, 19 (1946).
49 Schwinger v. Hickock, 53 N. Y. 280 (1873).50 Steel v. Norton, 110 Misc. 730, 182 N. Y. Supp. 76 (Sup. Ct 1916),
aff'd, 182 App. Div. 903, 168 N. Y. Supp. 1130 (2d Dep't 1918).5 1Garfein v. McInnis, 248 N. Y. 261, 162 N. E. 73 (1928).52 McKennell v. Payne, 197 App. Div. 349, 189 N. Y. Supp.'7 (2d Dep't
1921).
53 Slater v. Kruh, 261 App. Div. 810, 24 N. Y. S. 2d 827 (1st Dep't 1941).54 Fenchtwanger v. Central Hanover Bank, 288 N. Y. 342, 43 N. E. 434
(1942).
55 Schwinger v. Hickock 53 N. Y. 280 (1873).58 Pacek v. Ferrar, 258 App. Div. 772, 14 N. Y. S. 2d 814 (4th Dep't 1939).
57 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Act § 1108.5s N. Y. LimN LAW § 208.
59 Paprin v. Bitker, 64 N. Y. S. 2d 289 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
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whether or not money damages in lieu of a judgment affecting the
specific property can be rendered. Historically, equity would remand
the plaintiff to an action at law for his damages. Since the joinder
of law and equity damages may now be given in the same court mi
the exercise of its law function. Where damages are sought at law
for breach of contract the action is one for a sum of money only. In
such an action the procurement of a warrant of attachment 1o is a
prerequisite for obtaining an order for service by publication.6' It
seems doubtful that damages which fall within Section 232-3,6-2 can
be obtained under Section 232-2,I' in lieu of a judgment affecting the
specific property. Thus under Section 232-2, service by publication
against an absent defendant, resident or non-resident gives rise to
in rem jurisdiction.
Under Section 232-3 64 service by publication may be ordered
when a prior levy upon the defendant's property within the state has
been made under a warrant of attachment. Attachment is limited to
actions for a sum of money only.65 In New York, "the attachment
statutes authorize an attachment in actions for recovery of money
only. Under such provision, an attachment is not allowed in equity
actions, or actions at law, where the plaintiff seeks incidental equitable
relief." 66 Attachment is not permitted in an action for specific per-
formance although the alternate prayer is one for a money judgment. "
Nor may an attachment be procured in an action to foreclose a mort-
gage despite plaintiff's request for a deficiency judgment.6 In
replevin although it is a law action, an attachment is not permitted
since the demand is for the return of the chattel and not for a sum
of money only. Thus the phrase, "a sum of money only" has a set-
tled meaning today as it is used in the New York statutes. The jur-
isdiction acquired over a non-resident defendant pursuant to Section
232-3 is quasi in rem. To satisfy the requirements of due process
under the United States Constitution, the attachment levy must be
made prior to service by publication to give the court jurisdiction
over the action. The attachment of the property is the basis of juris-
diction, and the execution on the judgment must be limited to the
extent of the property attached. 0 As against a resident defendant
service by publication after an attachment levy upon his property
60 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 903.
61N. Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr §§232(a), 232(b).
62 N. Y. Civ. PRAa Acr § 232(3) ; see note 8 sup'ra.63 N. Y. Civ. PaAc. Ac .32(2); see note 8 supra.
64 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §232(3); see note 8 supra.
65 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT 1902.
66 7 REP. JUDIcIAL CouNcm 397, 398 (1941).6 7 Olsen v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 23D N. Y. 31, 128 N. E. 908
(1920).68 Smyth v. Mayer, 105 Misc. 391, 174 N. Y. Supp. 197 (Sup. Ct 1918),
aff'd, 188 App. Div. 954, 176 N. Y. Supp. 922 (lst Dep't 1919).69 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565 (1877).
TON. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acv §641(1).
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gives in personam jurisdiction. As an owner of property is at all
times deemed to be in constructive possession of his property,71 the
attachment primarily serves a notice giving purpose. It is not the
basis of jurisdiction over the resident. The execution on the judg-
ment is not limited to the specific property attached,72 but on the con-
trary requires execution out of unattached personal property prior
to execution out of attached realty.73
As to matrimonial, specific property, and actions where an at-
tachment levy has been made, the past history of Section 235 shows
that it is interrelated with Section 232 and that it is subject to the
same limitations on jurisdiction as Section 232. The discussed limi-
tations on service by publication apply also to personal service without
the state. This view of the scope of Section 235 would follow the
intent of the draftsmen of the statute as shown in the revisor's note
annexed to the statute that nothing was to be changed.
The origin of that part of Section 235 which permits personal
service on a resident defendant without the state in an action for a
sum of money only is of importance. That provision alone is the new
part of the section. Its origin should give some indication of the
section's interpretation. The actions specified in Section 232 and
now incorporated in Section 235 by reference were formerly enu-
merated in Section 235, and also in Section 232 with substantially
the same wording. In the initial drafts of all the statutes dealing
with service by publication 74 and service without the state without
an order 75 it was proposed that this provision should be included in
Section 232 and that Section 235 should merely be a general section
authorizing service without the state in all the actions enumerated
in Section 232.76 The purpose of the inclusion of that proposed part
of Section 232 was to permit personal jurisdiction of a resident de-
fendant without iequiring a prior warrant of attachment.7 7  The view
of the draftsmen was that an attachment is an onerous burden upon
a plaintiff. It is lengthy, expensive and could be dispensed with. A
plaintiff could still proceed, however, by procuring a warrant of at-
71 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565 (1877).
72N. Y. Civ. PAc. Acr §645(2).
73 Place v. Riley, 98 N. Y. 1 (1885).
74N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT §§232, 232(a), 232(b), 233, 234.
75 N. Y. Civ. PpAc. ACT § 235.
76 11 REP. JUDICIAL COUNCIL 194, 213 (1945).
Thus Section 232 as proposed read: ". . . 1. Where the defendant is a
resident of the state, and the complaint demands judgment for a sum of money
only. 2. Where the complaint demands judgment annulling a marriage, or for
a divorce .... 3. Where the complaint demands judgment that the defen-
dant be excluded from . . . interest in or lien upon specific real or personal
property within the state .... 4. Where a levy has been made upon property
of the defendant within the state . . . ; and Section 235 as proposed read:
... In all cases where an order directing the service of a summons upon a
defendant, by publication, is procurable .... "
77 11 REP. JUDICIAL COUNCIL 197, 203 (1945).
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tachment. "The proposed amendment dispensing with the need for
a prior attachment where residents are concerned, supplements the
existing provision authorizing the making of an order for service of
summons by publication where an attachment has actually been
levied." 78 Also preserved was the rule that a prior attachment would
be necessary in the case of a non-resident defendant for the court to
acquire jurisdiction.79 In this form 80 the bill was passed in 1945
by the legislature but vetoed by the governor. The reason given was
that the bills allowed an action against a resident with jurisdiction
being acquired by service by publication alone and without the notice
giving effect of a prior attachment.8 ' By way of remedy the pro-
vision was deleted from Section 232 and included in Section 235. In
this manner the revision was adopted.8 2 The change insured the
absent resident defendant of actual notice of the action against him
by personal service and not merely by publication. At the same time
it benefited the plaintiff by not requiring the vexatious attachment
proceedings, but permitting it if desired.
The jurisdiction acquired under this provision is in personam.
-Indeed, there is complete absence of any res, status, or attachment
which is necessary for an in rem or quasi in rem proceeding. Fur-
ther, the extent of the designers of the section was to take advantage
of the decision in Milliken v. Meyer 8 3 by the Supreme Court of the
United States as to what procedure by a state is sufficient notice and
opportunity to defend to an absent resident to constitute due process.8 4
The Court there held that a resident of a state as incident to his citi-
zenship owes the duty to the state of being amenable to suit even
though he is without the territorial limits of the state. Due process
is satisfied by adequate notice and opportunity to defend. 5 The test
to be applied is that the proceeding shall not be contrary to natural
justice. "To dispense with personal service the substitute that is
most likely to reach the defendant is the least that ought to be re-
quired if substantial justice is to be done." 8 6 The statute which was
there in issue is substantially the same as Section 235.
The actions which are encompassed by the phrase "for a sum
of money only," are those discussed supra. The phrase has been
borrowed from the attachment statutes and has the same meaning
here.
78 9 REP. JuDIcIAL COUNCm 348 (1943).79 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565 (1877).
80 See note 76 supra.
81 12 REP. JuricLa.L CouNcIL 58 (1946).
82 See note 8 supra.
83 311 U. S. 457, 85 L. ed. 278 (1940), rehearing denied, 312 U. S. 712, 85
L. ed. 1143 (1940).
84 12 REP. JUDICIAL CouNcri 58, 59 (1946).8 5 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 85 L. ed. 278 (1940), rehearing denied,
312 U. S. 712, 85 L. ed. 1143 (1940).
86 McDonald v. Mabee, 293 U. S. 90, 92, 61 L. ed. 608, 610 (1917).
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In conclusion it may be said that the jurisdiction acquired against
a non-resident defendant is the same whether the service be by pub-
lication or personally without the state. In the absence of an appear-
ance it is in rem or quasi in rem and cannot be made the basis of an
in personam action. Obviously, actions for a sum of money only are
inapplicable to non-residents. 87
As against residents of the state, in the case of an attachment
levy, with service by either method, the jurisdiction acquired is suf-
ficient for the court to render an in personam judgment. In matri-
monial actions and actions involving specific property the view may
be taken that against residents the jurisdiction is the same whether
the service be by publication or personally without the state. This
view is based on a strict judicial interpretation of the revised sections.
The indications that no change was intended, the similarity of lan-
guage of the old and new sections, the prior determination of mutual
applicability of both sections, all lend their support to such view. It
may be noted that Sections 232 and 235 were strictly construed.88
There are no cases prior to the 1946 revision which granted more
than in rem or quasi in rem relief to a party proceeding under either
section. There is a current of authority already noted which indi-
cates that in personam relief may not be had.
It is possible, however, to take another view of the jurisdiction
acquired in matrimonial and specific property actions over a resident
defendant when service is made pursuant to Section 235. A resident
of the state as incident to his citizenship owes the duty to be amenable
to suit even though he is without the territorial limits of the state.8 9
The extent of the jurisdiction acquired is determined by the reason-
ableness of the notice given and the adequacy of the opportunity to
defend. Fair play and substantial justice are the tests.9 0 Actual
notice by personal service without the state satisfies the test.91
Under this view the jurisdiction acquired over an absent resident is
in personam. Under the 1946 revision a personal judgment is per-
mitted 92 where jurisdiction is acquired by personal service without
the state. However, such a judgment is not permitted where the
service is by publication unless there is a prior attachment. This
change recognized the rule of the Milliken case.98 When the notice
giving effect of a prior attachment was not deemed necessary, per-
sonal service without the state was required. Section 235 recog-
nizes the superior notice giving effect of personal service to service
by publication. It meets the substantial justice test and allows more
s N. Y. Civ. PaAc. Acr § 235.
88 Rose v. Heller, 190 App. Div. 519, 179 N. Y. Supp. 821 (1st Dep't 1920).
89 Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N. Y. 217 (1878) ; Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457,
85 L. ed. 278 (1940) rehearing denied, 312 U. S. 712, 85 L. ed. 1143 (1940).90 McDonald v. Mabee, 293 U. S. 90, 61 L. ed. 608 (1917).
9 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 85 L. ed. 278 (1940), rehearing denied,
312 U. S. 712, 85 L. ed. 1143 (1940).92 N. Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT § 235.
8 12 REP. JUvDicaL COUNCm 58, 59 (1946).
NOTES AND COMMENT
comprehensive jurisdiction, i.e., in personam when the action is com-
menced by actual notice. By implication, at least this view has been
embodied in Section 235. Should the superiority of personal notice
be recognized in the first clause of Section 235 and be ignored in the
succeeding clause? The statute is susceptible to either interpreta-
tion. Constitutionality poses no problem."4
Up to the present time no Court of Appeals decision has come
down interpreting Section 235 as related to marital actions or actions
affecting specific property. There have been several reported lower
court cases which are interesting to note.95 Ellsworth v. Ellsworth 96
Was a iatrimonial action wherein the plaintiff wife sought a judicial
separation. Motion was made for temporary alimony and counsel
fees. It was alleged that the defendant husband was a resident of
New York. He was served personally without the state pursuant to
Section 235. The court held that Section 235 in reference to matri-
monial actions applied to both the in rem aspect of the action and
the in personam aspect. If the defendant is a resident of the state,
the jurisdiction acquired will allow, not only a change in the marital
status but also an order for temporary alimony and counsel fees.
The court cites the Milliken case 97 as the basis for jurisdiction so
acquired. Concededly the Federal Constitution permits a state to
exercise such jurisdiction over its residents. The court did not cite
any controlling New York authorities for its holdings nor did it in-
dicate how the legislature by the 1946 revision availed itself of the
Milliken rule in matrimonial actions. In Feldman v. Feldman 9 8 the
same question was presented as in the Ellsworth case. Subject to a
fact finding by a referee the court indicated it would follow the same
rule. Section 235 was sought to be utilized in Altholz v. Altholz 99
to procure a declaratory judgment declaring invalid a prior divorce
obtained by the other spouse. In view of the prior interpretations
and limited application of old Section 235 the court ignored the
Milliken v. Meyer decision as a basis for a New York court having
jurisdiction. It was stated "If the Legislature intended to encom-
pass all actions affecting the matrimonial status in the present legis-
lative scheme of extra territorial jurisdiction, it could easily have
so indicated." 1 00 In Brainard v. Brainard 0 1 decided in the Appel-
late Division little light is cast upon the problem. The reason for
94 Note, 32 CORN. L. Q. 600 (1947).95 Ellsworth v. Ellsworth, - Misc. -, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 522 (Sup. Ct 1947);
Feldman v. Feldman, 19 Misc. 564, 72 N. Y. S. 2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1947);
Altholz v. Altholz, - Misc. -, 72 N. Y. S. d 143 (Sup. Ct 1947); Brainard
v. Brainard - App. Div. -, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 1 (1st Dep't 1947).
96-... Misc. -, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 522 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
97 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 85 L. ed. 278 (1940), rehearing denied,
312 U. S. 712, 85 L. ed. 1143 (1940).
98 189 Misc. 564, 72 N. Y. S. 2d 390 (Sup. Ct 1947).99 Altholz v. Altholz, - Misc. -, 72 N. Y. S. 2d 143 (Sup. Ct. 1947).100 HI. at 144.
101.... App. Div. -, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 1 (1st Dep't 1947).
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this is that although the plaintiff utilized Section 235 for service in
an action seeking divorce and alimony, the court held that the defen-
dant had, by interposing an answer, made a general appearance.
However, a dissent recognized that the application of Section 235 is
not yet settled. The position taken was that the defendant had not
subjected himself personally to the jurisdiction of the court and in
stating that the case should be remanded, added, "the effect of that
section (235) could be tested in that event." 102
RICHARD S. HOFFMAN,
GEORGE R. McELROY.
DERIVATIVE ACTIONS BY POLICYHOLDERS
During the past century there has been considerable expansion
and growth in the business of insurance, until today a large portion
of the wealth of this nation is in the hands of insurance companies.
Whenever there are large holdings and concentrations of wealth, there
will also be attempts at control by those who have, in any way, an
interest in such holdings. Such attempts are illustrated by those ac-
tions brought by policyholders under theories analogous to those
which lie behind a stockholders' derivative action. The existence of
the right of a policyholder to bring such a derivative action has re-
ceived scant clear-cut judicial or legislative recognition, therefore if
the right exists, it requires clarification as to its nature and extent.
Fundamentally, derivative actions were evolved for the purpose
of exercising an additional check on the management of a corporation
and as a further protection of those who had a beneficial interest in
its assets and affairs. There is no doubt that the stockholders' deriva-
tive action has proved a wholesome means of protecting the stock-
holder's interest, not only because it has afforded a means of obtaining
redress for injuries and wrongs actually inflicted but also because it
has prevented many acts of mismanagement. Since a corporation is
a separate entity, the ownership of all the property is in its name and
any cause of action that accrues belongs to the corporation and not
to the stockholders individually or collectively.1  The corporation
must act through its duly authorized agents, namely its officers and
Board of Directors, but they may not always act in the best interest
of the corporation or they may neglect to pursue the corporation's
rights. In theory, the stockholder has control over the management
202 Brainard v. Brainard, mipra note 100.
1 Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N. Y. 7, 15, 99 N. E. 138, 141
(1912).
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